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III.
A.

ARGUMENT

STATEMENTS IN TRAVELLER'S BRIEFS IN SUPPORT OF ITS CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVE NO BEARING ON THIS
APPEAL
In its appellate brief, Questar focused considerable attention upon selected

statements from Traveller's briefs in support of its motion for summary judgment.
Questar's Appellate Brief, pp. 1-3, 9, and 14-16. Questar contends in citing to these
statements that Traveller previously agreed there were no disputed material facts
regarding the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant. In response, however, Traveller asserts
that Questar has misinterpreted or misconstrued these statements; and, additionally, that
Utah appellate courts have consistently recognized that assertions of undisputed material
facts to support a cross-motion for summary judgment are not undisputed facts for
appellate review purposes.
1. Questar Misinterpreted or Misconstrued Traveller's Statements
Regarding the Burgesses' Intent
Shortly after the pleadings in this case were framed and before the completion of
any substantive discovery, Questar filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
supported by a memorandum of points and authorities. R. 27-58. Traveller then filed a
memorandum in opposition to Questar's motion for summary judgment and cross-motion
for summary judgment. R. 93-120. The following statements of purported material fact
from Questar's memorandum and Traveller's detailed denials thereof clearly demonstrate

that Traveller never accepted Questar's factual contentions regarding the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant:
Questar's statement of undisputed material fact (R. 28):
2. At the time Mountain Fuel installed the pipeline, Rodney C.
Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess were the beneficiaries of a Trust Deed
wherein Progressive Investment Corp. was the trustee [sic], which Trust
Deed covered the Subject Property.
Traveller's response (R. 94-95):
2. Denied. Although Plaintiff acknowledges there is a document on
record with the Washington County Recorder's Office entitled "Trustee's
Deed Upon Sale" as set forth in Paragraph 2 of Defendant's Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts, Plaintiff asserts that there is a very real and
material dispute of fact as to whether Progressive Investment
Corporation was the sole legal owner of the Subject Property at the
time of said foreclosure proceeding. In reality, between June 10, 1980,
and July 26, 1989, the Subject Property was collectively owned in varying
portions by the following entities: Progressive Acquisition, Inc., a Nevada
corporation; St. George #5 Partnership; St. George #6 Partnership; St.
George #7 Partnership; and Progressive Investment Corporation, a Nevada
corporation, as trustee under a trust agreement dated the 24th day of
February 1986, known as "Red Hills Trust;" rather than being owned singly
throughout this period by Progressive Investment Corporation as intimated
by Defendant. Progressive Acquisition, Inc., acquired its right, title and
interest in the real property described in Exhibit 1 on or about June 10,
1980. See Aff. Heiner f6 on file with the Court. St. George #5 Partnership
acquired its right, title and interest in the real property described in Exhibit
1 on or about December 3, 1980. See Id. St. George #6 Partnership
acquired its right, title and interest in the real property described in Exhibit
1 on or about January 14, 1981. See Id. St. George #7 Partnership acquired
its right, title and interest in the real property described in Exhibit 1 on or
about December 3, 1980. See Id. Progressive Investment Corporation, as
trustee under a trust agreement dated the 24th day of February 1986 (known
as "Red Hills Trust) acquired its right, title and interest to the real property
described in Exhibit 1 on or about February 5, 1986. See Id. All of these
entities collectively retained the above rights, titles and interests in the real
property described in Exhibit 1 until July 26, 1989. See Id. (Emphasis
added).

Questar's statement of undisputed material fact (R. 28):
4. On December 2, 1988, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L.
Burgess agreed to and warranted a Right-of-Way and Easement Grant
wherein Mountain Fuel, its successors and assigns, were granted a specific
right-of-way and easement 22' feet wide to "lay, maintain, operate, repair,
inspect, protect, remove and replace pipe lines, valves, valve boxes and
other gas transmission and distribution facilities through and across" the
Subject Property. (Emphasis in original).
Traveller's response (R. 95-96):
4. Denied. Although Plaintiff acknowledges there is a document on
record with the Washington County Recorder's Office entitled "Right-ofWay and Easement Grant" as set forth in Paragraph 4 of Defendant's
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Plaintiff asserts that there is a
very real and material dispute of fact as to what Rodney C. Burgess
and Elizabeth L. Burgess meant or intended by affixing their
signatures below the phrase "AGREED and WARRANTED" on the
last page of the document At the time of executing this document neither
Rodney C. Burgess nor Elizabeth L. Burgess had any legal ownership
interest in the Subject Property. As such, stating that they
"WARRANTED" the granting of an easement to Mountain Fuel does not
carry the same legal effect as if the Burgesses were the legal owners of the
Subject Property. Defendant's contention that the Burgesses were
warranting title to the Subject Property as if they were in fact the legal
owners of the same is misplaced and speculative. Under Utah law although
recitals in deeds are presumptively valid, it is improper to imply anything
more from such recitals than is clear from the bare terms and facts
surrounding the deed. Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980
(1972). Aside from the above-referenced clause "AGREED and
WARRANTED" there is no other language in the document that refers
to the Burgesses, Moreover, Defendant has not offered any affidavit or
other means of credible evidence to support its theory of what the
Burgesses meant by singing their names beneath the phrase "AGREED
and WARRANTED," Without such foundational support for a
purported undisputed material fact in a motion for summary
judgment, the fact should not be accepted as "undisputed," Connor v.
Union Pac. R.R., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998) (reasoning that a mere
assertion that is wholly unsupported by valid evidence cannot become an
undisputed material fact for purposes of supporting a motion for summary
judgment). (Emphasis added).

Obviously, these quoted passages provide the clearest statement of what Traveller agreed
were, or in this case were not, undisputed material facts. Moreover, it is clear from the
argument portion of Traveller's memorandum in opposition/cross-motion for summary
judgment that it believed the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant was so facially flawed,
lacking the typical structure and content of a written easement, that the trial court should
have granted Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment and denied Questar's
motion for summary judgment. R. 109-110.
In response to Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment, Questar filed a
motion under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that additional
discovery was needed before it could reasonably respond to the statement of facts and
arguments set forth in Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 145-148.
Traveler opposed Questar's Rule 56(f) motion, and therein put forth the statement
Questar has now seized upon in support of its argument that Traveller agreed before the
trial court that there were no issues of material fact in dispute. R. 149-175.
Questar's assertion loses all credibility when Traveller's statements that "both
parties have asked the Court to examine the 'Right-of-Way and Easement Grant'
document on its face and within its four corners" (R. 152), and "intent and notice are
immaterial to the resolution of the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment because the
Court can examine the document on its face and within its four corners and make a
ruling" (R. 154), are placed in proper context alongside the argument underpinning
Traveller's cross-motion for summary judgment: namely, that the document is so facially

defective that is supports summary dismissal in favor of Traveller. Traveller remains
committed to this position.
Thus, Traveller never agreed before the trial court that the Burgesses' intent to
grant an easement was clearly manifested within the four corners of the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant. Rather, Traveller asserted then, just as it now does, that there were
material issues of fact regarding the Burgesses' intent and before the trial court examined
the Burgesses' intent it should have first determined whether the document met the legal
requirements necessary to effect a conveyance of an interest in real property.
2. Facts in Cross-motions for Summary Judgment Do Not Amount to
Concessions on Appeal
Next, assuming arguendo that Traveller had stated for purposes of supporting its
cross-motion for summary judgment that the Burgesses' intent was clearly manifested in
the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant, such a "fact" would have no bearing upon an
appellate court. See, e.g., Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (stating "cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate
factual issues, even though both parties contend . . . . that they are entitled to prevail
because there are no material issues of fact" (citations omitted). Rather, cross-motions
may be viewed as involving a contention by each movant that no genuine issue of fact
exists under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no dispute remains under
the theory advanced by its adversary" (citations omitted). "In effect, each cross-movant
implicitly contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but that if the court
determines otherwise, factual disputes exist which preclude summary judgment as a

matter of law in favor of the other side" (citations omitted)). Further, mAmjacs
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981) (quoting 6 Moore's
Federal Practice para. 56.13 at 341-344 (2d Ed. 1976)), the Supreme Court of Utah
observed as follows:
The well-settled rule is that cross-motions for summary judgment do not
warrant the court granting summary judgment unless one of the moving
parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not
genuinely disputed.
Good sense and sound theory, if these be distinguishable, combine to
produce the rule. Good sense, because neither a single motion nor multiple
motions can dissipate factual disputes. Sound theory, for at least three
reasons: (1) because a party entitled to summary judgment must bear the
burden of establishing the indisputability of the facts which warrant
judgment in his favor; (2) while the facts, which would justify judgment for
one party on a particular legal theory, may be indisputable, the facts, which
would justify judgment for the adverse party on a different legal theory,
may be disputed; and (3) a party may make concessions for the purpose of
his motion that do not carry over and support the motion of his adversary.
In light of the above procedural reasoning by Utah courts, perhaps both parties
were premature in filing their motions for summary judgment in this case. Nevertheless,
based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court record and Utah law, Traveller is clearly
entitled to argue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined,
"over Plaintiffs objection" and amid disputed material facts regarding the Burgesses'
intent and facial challenges to the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant, that the Burgesses
"granted an easement." R. 536. Therefore, Questar's assertion that Traveller failed to
"properly raise issues of intent before the trail court, and cannot raise such issues now on
appeal" is incorrect. Questar's Appellate Brief, p. 7.

B. THE 'RIGHT-OF-WAY AND EASEMENT GRANT5 FAILS TO MEET BASIC
STANDARDS FOR AN INSTRUMENT OF CONVEYANCE; THEREFORE, THE
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY
1. There Is a Minimum Standard Under Utah Law for an Instrument of
Conveyance
Examination of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant reveals the following facial
defects: (1) the Burgesses are not the named grantor in the document; (2) the Burgesses'
signatures are not on the signature lines prepared for the grantor; (3) the operative
granting language in the document was specifically directed to Progressive Investment
Corporation; and (4) the Burgesses only "agreed and warranted" the grant set forth in the
document. Apart from these obvious facial defects, Traveller introduced additional
evidence before the trial court, through the Affidavit of Mark C. Heiner, a certified title
examiner, that on the date the Burgesses signed the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant,
neither the named grantor, Progressive Investment Corp., nor the Burgesses were the
record owners of the subject property. R. 66-71. Yet, in the face of all this
countervailing evidence, Questar argues that "[t]here is nothing within the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant to suggest a contrary intent." Questar's Appellate Brief, p. 10.
Quite literally, then, Questar is arguing that there are no threshold prerequisites to the
application of the after-acquired title doctrine; or, stated another way, any piece of paper
with a legal description and a signature will do.
Questar's literal position is defeated on several points. Before discussing these
points it is important to note that there does not appear to be any Utah case summarizing
formal requirements for the application of the after-acquired doctrine to easements.

Indeed, the extension of the after-acquired title doctrine to easements was only recently
recognized in Utah. See Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721. Yet, there is
a considerable body of Utah case law discussing the application of this doctrine to
conveyances of estates in land.
First, in every Utah case annotating the after-acquired title statute (Utah Code
Ann. §57-1-10) the named grantor in the intended instrument of conveyance was also the
person or entity that signed the document. See, e.g., Cox v. Ney, 580 P.2d 1085 (Utah
1978); Ketchum v. Pleasant Valley Coal, Co., 257 F. 274 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 250 U.S.
668, 40 S. Ct. 14, 63 L. Ed. 1198 (1919), appeal dismissed, 254 U.S. 616, 41 S. Ct. 147,
65 L. Ed. 440 (1920); Wall v. Utah Copper Co., 277 F. 55 (8th Cir. 1921); Arnold Indus.
v. Love, supra; Barlow Socyy v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986); and
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (1987). As noted above,
the Burgesses were not the named grantor in the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant and
never signed their names on the signature lines provided for the named grantor.
Second, Utah courts have recognized that not all written instruments are sufficient
to invoke the after-acquired title doctrine. For example, the after-acquired title doctrine
will not apply to a conveyance made by quit claim deed. See Barlow Soc 'y, 723 P.2d at
400; see also Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 268-69, 186 P.2d 965, 968
(1947). This analytical point obviously disproves Questar's literal position that any piece
of paper with a legal description and a signature will do.
Third, if a quit claim deed does not pass after-acquired title, logic would dictate
that the formalities of a warranty deed are necessary. The Utah statute describing the

requisite form of a warranty deed clearly provides through its exemplary text that the
grantor named in the instrument must also sign the instrument.
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of residence), hereby conveys
and warrants to(insert name), grantee, of (insert place of residence), for the
sum of [ ] dollars, the following described tract of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this (month/day/year).
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 (2004) (emphasis added). As stated above, the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant failed in this regard.
Furthermore, the absence of express granting language makes the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant instrument legally deficient. The express granting language in this
document is contained in the first paragraph and by its clear terms applies only to
Progressive Investment Corporation, the named grantor. The Burgesses merely "agreed
and warranted" the document, which is legally insufficient.
In Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, ^|9, 977 P.2d 533, the Court of Appeals
stated: "Words that clearly show an intention to grant an easement are sufficient,
provided the language is certain and definite." Furthermore, even where it appears that
the intent of the parties was to create an easement, if there is "language that is vague,
inconsistent, [or] ambiguous" the instrument will fail. Id. at Tf 11. In the present
controversy, there are significant questions of fact regarding the Burgesses' intent and,
perhaps more importantly, the document is facially defective in many ways as noted
above, making it legally vague, inconsistent and ambiguous. As such, the trial court

should not have applied the after-acquired title doctrine to grant Questar's motion for
summary judgment.
In Dowse v. Kamrnerman, 122 Utah 85, 87, 246 P.2d 881, 882 (1952), the
Supreme Court of Utah said: "There is no diversity of opinion to the rule that estoppel by
deed [and the after-acquired title doctrine] operate[] only where the conveyance is
intended to convey a particular estate, which the grantor subsequently acquires"
(emphasis added). The defendant in Dowse sought to enlarge the doctrine of estoppel by
deed by citing to cases of equitable estoppel in support of the proposition that an afteracquired title should pass by quitclaim deed. Id. In rejecting this position, the Supreme
Court observed that
the existence of the estoppel does not rest on the prevention of fraud, or on
the fact of a representation actually believed to be true. It is a technical
effect of a technical representation, the extent of which is determined by the
scope of the words devoted to making it.
Id. at 89.
The Right-of-Way and Easement Grant fails as a "technical representation" that
should give rise to the "technical effect" of an easement by estoppel or after-acquired
title. Arguably, the Burgesses' language of "agreeing" and "warranting" an easement
was not as technically precise and appropriate as "granting" an easement, which,
following the model set forth in Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 and the Dowse case, would
have provided the clearest expression of their intent. Therefore, at the very least, the trial
court should have required the parties to delve into the Burgesses' intent; instead, it

abused its discretion by ignoring disputed material facts and read into the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant meanings and actions that were not facially evident.
2. The Burgesses Never Intended to Grant an Easement When
They Signed the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant; Instead, They
Were Subordinating Their Security Interest in the Property to that
of the Intended Easement Holder
Examination of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant begs the question: If the
Burgesses were the intended grantors of the easement-creating document, as argued by
Questar, why were they neither the named grantors nor signatories on the signature lines
provided for the grantors? Traveller suggested in its appellate brief that "as the
beneficiaries of a trust deed on the subject property it is more likely [the Burgesses] were
manifesting their intent to subordinate their security interest in the property to the interest
of the intended easement holder." Traveller's Appellate Brief, p. 12. Questar assailed
this suggestion in its appellate brief, suggesting that such a position was speculative and
unfounded. Questar's Appellate Brief, pp. 13-16. In fact, Questar challenged Traveller
to identify any evidence from the record to sustain its suggestion. Questar's Appellate
Brief, pp. 13-16.
The Trustee's Deed Upon Sale, which is appended as Exhibit "A" to Questar's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment, is just the
piece of record evidence to support Traveller's "suggestion." R. 39-44. Within this
document are contained the following statements concerning the trust deed that was
foreclosed:
WHEREAS, Progressive Acquisitions, Inc., a Nevada corporation, as
Trustor, by Deed of Trust dated June 10, 1980, and recorded in the office of

the County Recorder of Washington County, State of Utah, on June 19,
1980,. ..
WHEREAS, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess, the Beneficiary
and holder of the Note, made a declaration of default and demand for sale
upon the Trustee, and filed for record, through the Trustee, on March 22,
1989,... a Notice of Default and Election to Sell. . .
WHEREAS, Trustee did [on July 26, 1989] according to the Notice,.. . sell
at public auction [the property to the Burgesses by credit bid].
According to the document itself, the Burgesses signed the Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant on December 2, 1988. R. 46. Approximately four months later, the
subject property was noticed for a foreclosure sale; and four months thereafter, the
Burgesses became the owners of the subject property after purchasing it a foreclosure
sale by credit bid. R. 39-44.
This chronology of events makes it very unlikely that the Burgesses intended to
grant an easement when they signed the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant only a few
months before they became the legal owners of the property. Having been the
beneficiaries of a trust deed on the subject property since 1980, the Burgesses most likely
knew they were not the legal owners of the subject property, or why would they have
caused their trustee to commence foreclosure proceedings on the subject property in
March, 1989. Indeed, the granting language and manner of identifying the parties in the
Right-of-Way and Easement Grant support this conclusion as well. Thus, it is much
more likely that the Burgesses were merely intending to subordinate their security interest
in the subject property to that of the intended easement holder when they signed the
Right-of-Way and Easement Grant.

Although there may not yet be enough evidence to conclusively establish the
Burgesses' real intent when they signed the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant, there is,
on balance, much more record evidence in support of Traveller's assertions regarding the
Burgesses' intent. Therefore, regardless of whether the Court of Appeals examines these
arguments from the perspective of an abuse of discretion or employs the correctness
standard as advocated by Questar (Questar's Appellate Brief, p. 1), the result is the
same—the trial court reached an improper conclusion.
C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF THE BUILDER'S STATUTE OF
REPOSE TO PREVENT AN UNINTENDED APPLICATION OF
THE STATUTE

Traveller and Questar have each cited to a myriad of Utah cases and statutes in
support of their opposing arguments regarding the proper application of the Builder's
Statute of Repose. Traveller has additionally cited to extensive secondary sources,
primarily well-reasoned cases from other jurisdictions, and also identified the unintended
impact Questar's requested application of the Builder's Statute of Repose would have
upon other equally important statutory and common law rights.
Admittedly, all of the cases cited by Traveller and most of the cases cited by
Questar support the parties' opposing positions regarding the proper application of the
Builder's Statute of Repose. Yet, there is an inherent disconnect with these positions that
must be resolved by the Court of Appeals to settle the law in this area. Thus, the Court of
Appeals should take this opportunity to define the proper scope of the Builder's Statute of
Repose. In doing so, the Court of Appeals will be performing an appropriate and

important "double-check" on the legislature. See Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
949 P.2d 779, 783 (Utah App. 1997) (stating "the basic reasonableness of [the courts']
interpretation of [a] statute" is to provide an "appropriate double-check on the
interpretation [they] conclude emerges from a straightforward reading of the statute's
plain language."). By so doing, the Court of Appeals is not improperly replacing the
judgment of the legislature; instead, it is aiding the legislature by preventing an "absurd"
application of a statute. Id. (citing State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988)).
Traveller asserts that after examining all of the legal authorities cited by the parties and
the purpose of the Builder's Statute of Repose a clear decision will emerge—the
legislature simply never intended to apply the Builder's Statute of Repose as requested by
Questar because its high-pressure natural gas feeder line is not an "improvement" within
the meaning of the statute or under any other common sense meaning, and, secondly,
applying the statute as requested by Questar will eviscerate a myriad of other
longstanding statutory and common law rights.
D. CERTAIN OF QUESTAR'S MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS AND
REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE PARTIES' CITATION
OF THE RECORD AND CASE HOLDINGS OR PROPOSITIONS
OF LAW WARRANT CORRECTION OR ADDITIONAL
COMMENT
1. To the Extent the Parties Have Made Incorrect Citations to the Record such
Citations Are Not Germane to the Issues on Appeal
In its Appellate Brief, Questar criticized Traveller for asserting that its motion
from summary judgment was also at issue before the Court of Appeals. Questar's
Appellate Brief, p. 4. Traveller never intended by its statement that the trial court

"agreed to renew" its cross-motion for summary judgment it was properly at issue in this
appeal. Traveller's Appellate Brief, p. 4. Rather, Traveller's cross-motion for summary
judgment was essentially the "converse" position of the same arguments addressed in
Questar's motion for summary judgment. Id. Traveller acknowledges that its crossmotion for summary judgment is not technically at issue on appeal.
Next, Questar contended in its appellate brief that the record was silent as to when
Traveller discovered the high pressure natural gas feeder line on its property. Questar's
Appellate Brief, p. 7. Traveller acknowledges that the page references to the record it
cited (R. 74 and 99) do not specifically state that Traveller discovered the high pressure
natural gas feeder line on its property in 2002. However, this was not an attempt by
Traveller to mislead the Court of Appeals. Kay H. Traveller's affidavit, which was cited
in support of this statement of fact, was executed on November 1, 2002, and states:
"Questar Gas Company has refused to remove its natural gas line from my property
despite being requested to do so." R. 74. Moreover, Traveller's Complaint in this case
was filed on July 26, 2002, after Questar refused to remove the high pressure natural gas
feeder line. R. 1-9. Paragraph 7 of the Complaint states:
Plaintiff and its associated entities are presently engaged in a real estate
development project upon and around portions of the Subject Property.
Defendant's improper and unauthorized maintenance of a natural gas utility
line across portions of the Subject Property is impeding Plaintiff and its
associated business from completing their real estate development project.
R. 2-3 (emphasis added). Accordingly, these references in the record support Traveller's
statement of fact #10 that "Traveller discovered the existence of the high-pressure natural
gas utility upon its property in 2002 while it was performing certain excavation work in

furtherance of a commercial real estate development known as the Tonaquint Center,.. ."
Traveller's Appellate Brief, p. 8.
Regardless of the sufficiency of record support for this factual assertion by
Traveller, Questar is correct in pointing out that such fact is immaterial to the resolution
of this appeal. Again, Traveller never intended to mislead the Court of Appeals; instead
it included this "fact" only to set forth a more detailed chronology of events.
To the extent there was any impropriety by Traveller's inclusion of foregoing
"fact" Questar is guilty of similar impropriety. Questar asserted in its appellate brief that
"because of the feeder utility line, natural gas is now available to the very buildings
Traveller has erected on its property." Questar's Appellate Brief, p. 20. There is no
support in the record for this assertion of fact, and it is plainly contradicted in the record
by the Affidavit of Stanford S. McConkie in which he set forth his understanding "that
the Subject Property is served by a natural gas distribution line running under Dixie
Drive, which runs along the opposite side of the Subject Property" [from where the
natural gas line at issue is located]. R. 86.
2. Questar Is Guilty of the Very Same Analytical Method for which It
Criticizes Traveller; the Cases in Questar's Appellate Brief Reinforce
Traveller's Arguments
In its appellate brief, Questar criticized Traveller for citing to other Utah cases*
statutes and secondary sources to demonstrate that Questar's high-pressure natural gas
feeder line is not an "improvement" to Traveller's property. Questar's Appellate Brief,
pp. 8-9. In fact, elsewhere in its appellate brief, Questar went so far as to say the
following:

Although it is the Legislature's prerogative to modify a term by expanding
or limiting its definition, once the Legislature defines a term, a reviewing
court has no authority to assign it a different or contrary meaning.
Questar's Appellate Brief, p. 18. This statement is inaccurate. Courts frequently look to
other cases, statutes and secondary sources to divine the meanings of terms in statutes
when the proper application of such terms is unclear. By doing so, a court is not
assigning different or contrary meanings; rather, it is comparing, cross-checking and
verifying that by ruling a certain way it will give full effect to the legislature's intent.
Some of the very cases cited by Questar in its appellate brief demonstrate or cite
with authority this process. In O 'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281
(Utah 1998), the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the Court of Appeals, on other
grounds, and reasoned that although the Court of Appeals achieved the correct result it
improperly constricted the definition of a key term within the operative statute. The
Supreme Court observed as follows:
In concluding that the definition of full-time service sets a boundary which
defines overtime and that any hours worked in excess of forty hours per
week constitute overtime, the court of appeals ignored the usually
accepted meaning of the term. As [the plaintiff) himself acknowledges,
the usually accepted meaning of overtime is work in excess of some
defined, regularly scheduled work period. This understanding of
overtime is well illustrated by its definition is several dictionaries.
(Citations to Black's Law Dictionary, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, and Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary omitted).
Because we see nothing in this interpretation that would render the
statute inoperable or contradict the purpose of the [statute], we believe
that overtime, as used in the [statute], is properly defined as hours
worked in excess of an employee's regularly scheduled work period.
Id. at 281-282 (emphasis added). In this case, the Supreme Court consulted dictionaries
and recognized common, every-day usage of the term and reasoned that its "ruling

necessitate^] a case-by-case determination of an employee's regularly scheduled work
period" to determine proper application of the definition in the statute. Id. at 282.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals should examine dictionary definitions, common usage of
the term among real estate professionals, and reasoning from other cases and statutes, as
advocated by Traveller, to determine whether Questar's high-pressure natural gas feeder
line constitutes an improvement to Traveller's property within the meaning of the
Builder's Statute of Repose.
In Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, ^[22, 44 P.3d 767, the Supreme Court of
Utah cited with approval the following longstanding principles of statutory construction:
Although courts generally presume a legislative body chooses its words
advisedly, "a majority of cases permit the substitution of one word for
another if necessary to carry out the legislative intent or express clearly
manifested meaning" (internal citations omitted). "Properly understood,
an exercised with due caution, substitution of one word for another is not
judicial legislation, but arriving at a legislative intent defectively
expressed" (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Traveller contends that the legislative findings in the Builder's Statute of Repose are
"defectively expressed" because they do not set any boundaries to the application of the
statute, and, as explained elsewhere, by applying the statute so expansively as requested
by Questar, other statutory rights and longstanding common law doctrines are destroyed.
Another case cited by Questar in its appellate brief is Brixen & Christopher
Architects, P.C. v. Utah, 2001 UT App 210, 29 P.3d 650. In Brixen, the Court of
Appeals reasoned as follows:
Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and we have no reliable
sources that clearly fix the legislative purpose, we look to the
consequences of those readings to determine the meaning to be given the

statute (internal citations omitted). We "look to the reason, spirit, and sense
of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject mater of the
statute" [with which we are dealing] (internal citations omitted). Further,
we look "with an eye toward the construction that will achieve the best
results in practical application, will avoid unacceptable consequences, and
will be consistent with sound public policy" (internal citations omitted). In
other words, we interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences
(internal citations omitted).
Id. at ^J17 (emphasis added). Traveller implores the Court of Appeals to follow its prior
reasoning and interpret the Builder's Statute of Repose so as to avoid an absurd
consequence.

Lastly, Questar itself used the above-described analytical process when it cited to
the Public Utilities title of the Utah Code to demonstrate that it was a "utility" as defined
in the Builder's Statute of Repose. Questar5s Appellate Brief, p. 21. Therefore, Questar
has effectively acknowledged the need to consult additional sources to clarify the proper
application of the Builder's Statute of Repose. As such, Questar's criticism of
Traveller's similar analytical method is misplaced.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Traveller respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals clarify the scope of the
Builder's Statute of Repose by ruling that the statute does not bar equitable claims for
ejectment, declarative relief and quiet title; and also by ruling that because Questar's
high-pressure natural gas utility line provides no tangible benefit to Traveller's property it
is not an "improvement" within the meaning of the Builder's Statute of Repose. Lastly,
Traveller requests that the Court of Appeals rule that there was a disputed issue of
material fact regarding the Burgesses' execution of the Right-of Way and Easement

Grant and so the trial court abused its discretion in granting Questar's motion for
summary judgment; or as argued by Questar, the Court of Appeals may apply the
correctness standard to determine that the trial court misapplied the law in making legal
conclusions about the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant; either way the result is the
same. After so ruling, Traveller requests that the Court of Appeals remand this case to
the trial court with instructions to reinstate all causes of action in Traveller's Complaint,
as well as its argued but unpled cause of action to quiet title, and take further evidence
and reserve for the trier of fact the issue of the Burgesses' intent regarding the Right-ofWay and Easement Grant.
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